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WILD RIVERS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE WILD 
AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT AND THE 
ALLAGASH WILDERNESS WATERWAY 
Simon B. Burce* 
Abstract: The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) is a collaboration be-
tween the federal and state governments designed to preserve nationally 
significant rivers. Section 2(a)(ii) is an innovative provision of the WSRA, 
which allows states to designate rivers for review by the Secretary of the 
Interior for inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. 
When federal and state interests align, section 2(a)(ii) designation is an 
effective tool for encouraging state participation in river management. 
When state interests in a river diverge from federal interests, however, the 
contours of this collaboration raise difficult federalism questions because 
the federal government has traditionally regulated the management of 
natural resources, while states have traditionally regulated land use. Maine 
recently provoked these difficult federalism questions by unilaterally 
downgrading the status of the Allagash Wilderness Waterway. This Note 
examines the WSRA and argues that it preempts state laws that violate its 
federal purpose of preservation. 
Introduction 
 Nestled within the timber forests of northwest Maine, a pristine 
ninety-two mile sanctuary of streams and lakes flows along the Alla-
gash River.1 In 1966, the State of Maine established the Allagash Wil-
derness Waterway (AWW) to “preserve, protect and develop the maxi-
mum wilderness character” of this unspoiled area.2 Four years later, 
the Governor of Maine also applied to the U.S. Department of the 
                                                                                                                      
*Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–
08. The author wishes to thank David A. Nicholas for his invaluable guidance during the 
formation and writing of this Note. 
1 Maine Department of Conservation, Bureau of Parks & Lands, Allagash Wilderness 
Waterway, http://www.state.me.us/cgi-bin/doc/parks/find_one_name.pl?park_id=2 (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2008). 
2 Act of May 11, 1966, ch. 496, 1965 Me. Acts 61–68 (current version at Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1871–1890 (2006)). 
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Interior to include the AWW within the National Wild and Scenic Riv-
ers System (National System) as the first state-administered “wild” 
river area under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (WSRA).3 
 In approving the Governor’s application, the Secretary of the In-
terior noted that public access to the AWW would be limited to one 
road at each of the northern and southern borders of the protected 
area, allowing the vast area in between to conform to the WSRA’s 
mandate that a wild river be “generally inaccessible except by trail.”4 
Although prior to the application several private roads had been built 
to the river to facilitate logging for the surrounding timber industry, 
these roads did not affect significantly the “overall wilderness charac-
ter” of the river and eventually would be removed.5 
 In 2006, the Maine State Legislature passed—and the Governor 
approved—Legislative Document 2077, “An Act to Make Adjustments 
to the Allagash Wilderness Waterway.”6 The Act established six public 
roads and permanent bridges over the waterway, dissecting the AWW 
into several discrete segments and unilaterally downgrading it from a 
“wild” to a “scenic” river area within the classification structure of the 
WSRA.7 In so doing, the State of Maine reduced the level of state pro-
tection afforded to the AWW and, most likely, violated its mandate to 
administer the area “in such manner as to protect and enhance the 
values which caused it to be included in” the National System.8 
 The State of Maine’s recent act raises significant federalism ques-
tions with regard to its administration of the AWW.9 In the scheme of 
cooperative federalism established for state-nominated rivers under the 
WSRA, no federal enforcement mechanism exists for ensuring that a 
                                                                                                                      
3 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, §§ 1–17, 82 Stat. 906, 906–18 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2000)); Notice of Approval for Inclusion 
in National Wild and Scenic Rivers System as State Administered Wild River Area, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 11,525 ( July 17, 1970) [hereinafter Notice of Approval]. 
4 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b)(1); Notice of Approval, supra note 3, at 11,526. 
5 Notice of Approval, supra note 3, at 11,526. 
6 Act of Aug. 23, 2006, ch. 598, 2006 Me. Acts 1577. 
7 See 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b) (defining “wild” rivers as “generally inaccessible except by 
trail” and defining “scenic” rivers as “accessible in places by roads”); Act of Aug. 23, 2006, 
ch. 598, 2006 Me. Acts 1577, 1578. 
8 See 16 U.S.C. § 1281(a). In response to the downgrading of the AWW, several plain-
tiffs filed an action in federal district court arguing, in part, that Legislative Document 
2077 is preempted by the WSRA. Fitzgerald v. Harris, No. 07-16-B-W, 2007 WL 2409679, at 
*1 (D. Me. Aug. 20, 2007). On August 20, 2007, a U.S. Magistrate Judge issued a Recom-
mended Decision to Dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. Id. at *13. However, as of the publi-
cation of this Note, the district court has yet to accept or reject this recommendation. 
9 Id. § 1273(a); Act of Aug. 23, 2006, ch. 598, 2006 Me. Acts 1577. 
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state meets its goals of preserving the river.10 While the WSRA goes to 
great lengths to enable state-managed rivers’ inclusion in the system, it 
does not thereafter provide a federal remedy to protect these rivers 
when the state government fails to meet its obligations under the stat-
ute.11 Indeed, on the face of the WSRA, it is difficult to identify any 
power of the federal government to regulate the AWW.12 Yet, while the 
power-sharing relationship under the WSRA is unclear at first blush, a 
Supreme Court decision interpreting an older scheme of cooperative 
federalism designed to control pre-Prohibition liquor trafficking de-
fines the boundaries of power between the federal and state govern-
ments and provides guidance for interpreting this relationship.13 
 Part I of this Note examines the provisions and principles of the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968. Part II considers the origins and 
development of cooperative federalism, its current use in the context 
of environmental regulation, and an early example of cooperative 
federalism under the Webb-Kenyon Act to control the flow of liquor 
into “dry” states in the years before Prohibition. Part III examines the 
applicability of the law articulated by the Supreme Court in examin-
ing the Webb-Kenyon Act to the power relationship between the fed-
eral government and the State of Maine under the WSRA. Finally, 
Part IV argues that under any consideration of the statutory scheme 
established by the WSRA, the State of Maine did not have authority to 
enact Legislative Document 2077. 
I. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 
 The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act unequivocally pronounced Con-
gress’s intent to protect the natural values of the nation’s untram-
meled rivers: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that 
certain selected rivers of the Nation which, with their imme-
diate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable . . . val-
ues, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that 
they and their immediate environments shall be protected for 
                                                                                                                      
10 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000); James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. 
Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 326 (1917). 
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the benefit and enjoyment of present and future genera-
tions.14 
The WSRA was the culmination of numerous bills introduced through-
out the Eighty-Ninth and Ninetieth Congresses.15 The policy that the 
WSRA promoted, however, developed over the course of several dec-
ades, beginning in the 1930s, as advocates for the development of flood- 
and drought-protection plans (particularly in the Western States) nego-
tiated with preservationists to determine the best use of the nation’s riv-
ers.16 Born amid the collision between regional interests and national 
desires for preservation, the WSRA was a product of careful compro-
mise.17 The two most significant features that spurred the Act’s progress 
into law were its three-tier system for classifying rivers in the National 
System and its two-fold method for designating and protecting them as 
either state-administered rivers or federally administered rivers.18 
A. The Three-Part Classification System 
 A primary element of the WSRA that ensured the passage of the 
bill was its three-fold scheme for classifying protected rivers.19 The 
WSRA contains three categories for preservation: wild, scenic, and 
recreational.20 Each category of river under the WSRA is to be admin-
                                                                                                                      
14 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 1, 82 Stat. 906, 906 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000)). 
15 Dan Tarlock & Roger Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 Cornell L. 
Rev. 707, 710–11 (1970). Senator Church of Idaho introduced S.1446, 89th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1965) and, after it passed in the Senate but not the House, reintroduced the bill in 
the Ninetieth Congress as S.119, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967). Id. at 710 & n.18, 711. That 
year, Representative Saylor of Pennsylvania introduced in the House a similar bill from the 
previous Congress—H.R. 14,922, 89th Cong. (2d Sess. 1966). Id. at 711 & n.23. Each bill 
advanced discussions leading to the introduction by Representative Aspinall of Colorado 
of H.R. 8416, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967), which President Johnson signed into law on 
October 2, 1968. Id. at 711 & n.25. 
16 Id. at 708–09; see also Roger Tippy, Preservation Values in River Basin Planning, 8 Nat. 
Resources J. 259, 259 (1968). Ironically, although Senator Church’s first bill proposing to 
create a “National Wild Rivers System” was designed for river preservation, it conjured 
images of flood control, since the “literal wildness of a river [was] frequently advanced as a 
justification for flood control projects.” Id. at 273. 
17 See Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 713 nn.29 & 32. 
18 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 2. 
19 Id. § 2(b); see Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 713 n.29. 
20 See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b) (2000). The WSRA defines the 
three categories for inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System as follows: 
 (1) Wild river areas—Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of im-
poundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or 
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istered in such a way as to protect “the values which caused it to be 
included” in the National System.21 However, not all rivers in each 
category should be administered in the same way.22 The WSRA recog-
nizes that different rivers within each category have different values: 
“scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or 
other similar values.”23 Accordingly, administrators have devised vari-
ous schemes for regulating individual rivers within each category.24 
 As the WSRA progressed through congressional hearings, lawmak-
ers struggled to reach an appropriate balance between national uni-
formity and local particularity.25 Standards for preservation needed to 
be strict enough so that they could be ascertained and enforced, but 
also loose enough so that they did not place straight jackets on the ad-
ministrators’ ability to manage each unique river for its own values.26 By 
having three separate categories for preservation, the WSRA allowed 
for individual rivers to be administered to preserve their own outstand-
ingly remarkable values (ORVs), while also establishing clear manage-
ment standards that could be followed uniformly throughout the Na-
tional System.27 Thus, while the categories do not bind administrators 
                                                                                                                      
shorelines essentially primitive and waters unpolluted. These represent ves-
tiges of primitive America. 
 (2) Scenic river areas—Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of 
impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still largely primitive and shore-
lines largely undeveloped, but accessible in places by roads. 
 (3) Recreational river areas—Those rivers or sections of rivers that are 
relatively accessible by road or railroad, that may have some development 
along their shorelines, and that may have undergone some impoundment or 
diversion in the past. 
Id. 
21 Id. § 1281(a). 
22 Cassie Thomas, Nat’l Park Serv., Protecting Resource Values on Non-Federal 
Lands: Technical Report of the Interagency Wild and Scenic Rivers Coordinating 
Council 11 (1996), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Pro-
tecting Resource Values on Non-Federal Lands” hyperlink). 
23 16 U.S.C. § 1271. The AWW is administered as a “wild” river in order to “provide a 
wilderness canoe experience.” Maine State Park and Recreation Comm’n, The Alla-
gash Wilderness Waterway 1 (1970). 
24 Dan Haas, Nat’l Park Serv., Designating Rivers Through Section 2(a)(ii) of 
the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act: Technical Report of the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Coordinating Council 10–19 (2007), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Publications” hy-
perlink; then follow “Designating Rivers Through Section 2(a)(ii) of the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act” hyperlink). 
25 See Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 722 nn.69–71. 
26 See id. at 722–23; see also F. Fraser Darling & Noel D. Eichhorn, Man & Nature 
in the National Parks: Reflections on Policy 27 (1967) (discussing the importance of 
individualized park management). 
27 H.R. Rep. No. 90-1623, at 3 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3801, 3803. 
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to particular plans, they provide adequate guidelines for courts to de-
termine whether the managers of a designated river violate the WSRA 
by administering it at a lower level than is required to protect the river’s 
ORVs.28 
B. Section 5 Rivers Versus Section 2 Rivers 
 A second innovation within the WSRA was its two-fold mechanism 
for designating which rivers to study and subsequently to include in the 
National System.29 First, under section 5, rivers can be designated by an 
act of Congress and administered by the federal government.30 Second, 
rivers can be designated for study under section 2(a)(ii) when a state 
requests that the Secretary of the Interior study the river.31 If approved 
under section 2(a)(ii) by the Secretary, the river is included in the Na-
tional System.32 The proposal for a state-nominated component of the 
WSRA was introduced by Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, in di-
rect response to conflicts among federal and state proposals for pre-
serving the Allagash River.33 The section 2(a)(ii) method has subse-
quently proved to be a powerful incentive for encouraging states to 
include rivers in the National System.34 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Wilderness Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1207 (D. Mont. 
2000); Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 719–20. 
29 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, §§ 2, 5, 82 Stat. 906, 906–07, 910–11 
(1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1273, 1276 (2000)); Tarlock & Tippy, supra 
note 15, at 713 & n.32. 
30 16 U.S.C. § 1276. 
31Id. § 1273. Section 5 rivers are written into the WSRA, but section 2 rivers, which en-
ter the National System by approval of the Secretary of the Interior, are not added to the 
statute. See id. § 1274(a). 
32Id. § 1273; River Mileage Classifications for Components of the National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers System 1–17 (2007), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Publica-
tions” hyperlink; then follow “Wild & Scenic Rivers Table” hyperlink) [hereinafter River 
Mileage Chart]. 
33 Letter from Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, Me., to Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman In-
terior & Insular Affairs Comm., U.S. Senate ( June 8, 1965) (on file with the Edmund S. 
Muskie Collection, Bates College) [hereinafter Muskie Proposal Letter]. 
34 See Haas, supra note 24, at 7. The WSRA originally listed eight rivers to be instantly 
included within the National System and administered by either the Secretary of the Inte-
rior or the Secretary of Agriculture (the “Instant” rivers) and designated twenty-seven riv-
ers to be included in the system after study. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act §§ 3, 5. Today, the 
National System includes at least 187 rivers or sections of rivers, at least twenty of which are 
state-administered rivers. River Mileage Chart, supra note 32, at 1–17. 
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1. Federally Administered Rivers: Section 5 
 Section 5 of the WSRA requires the Secretaries of the Interior 
and Agriculture to study expeditiously each of the rivers that it lists, and 
to make a report to the President and Congress.35 While the twenty-
seven initial study rivers were to be studied, the WSRA protected them 
from development for five years, effectively granting the Secretaries 
power to veto any projects by the Federal Power Commission that 
would affect the characteristics for which the river was to be included in 
the National System.36 In addition to the initial study rivers, the WSRA 
allowed for further study rivers to be included under the WSRA through 
federal administration by act of Congress, and as of January 2007, at 
least 137 rivers or sections of rivers had been identified for study through 
section 5.37 
 The section 5 study process begins with the nomination of a river 
for inclusion in the National System, which is typically initiated by lo-
cal citizens, conservation groups, or Members of Congress interested 
in preserving a river area.38 As the first step in this process, an inter-
disciplinary study team (IDT) is convened to work in concert with lo-
cal stakeholders to make initial findings regarding the river’s eligibil-
ity.39 The study team uses these initial findings to prepare a long-term 
management plan, paying particular attention to areas of the river 
susceptible to land use changes that would threaten the river’s desig-
nation under the WSRA.40 
 The study process, which can be lengthy, is designed to promote 
coordination and participation in the management of the river among 
stakeholders.41 The period from introduction of a study proposal to 
passage of the congressional act authorizing the study often takes sev-
                                                                                                                      
35 16 U.S.C. § 1275(a). The Secretary of Agriculture administers rivers or sections of 
rivers that flow through federal lands. Id. 
36 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 7(b); Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 714. 
37 16 U.S.C. § 1276(a). 
38 Jackie Diedrich & Cassie Thomas, U.S. Forest Serv. & Nat’l Park Serv., The 
Wild & Scenic River Study Process: Technical Report of the Interagency Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Coordinating Council 8 (1999), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Pub-
lications” hyperlink; then follow “The Wild & Scenic River Study Process” hyperlink). 
39 Id. at 10. 
40 Id. at 11. 
41 Id. at 8–9. Local participation is essential for preserving ORVs—even in federally 
administered components of the National System—because many river-related values such 
as wildlife habitat, water quality, and scenery can be influenced by land use outside of a 
river’s boundaries. Thomas, supra note 22, at 6–7. To this extent, preservation requires 
mutual trust and cooperation among federal, state, and local governments and landown-
ers. Id. 
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eral years.42 During this time, stakeholders are identified, dialogue is 
fostered among various interest groups, and the amount of local sup-
port for designation is assessed.43 Through this process, Congress can 
refer to the various stakeholders in the study and require the adminis-
tering secretary to consult with the groups to encourage public partici-
pation in the study plan.44 Frequently, the last step in preparing a study 
is a municipal vote to evaluate local support.45 
 Once a study is complete, the IDT makes a recommendation to in-
clude a river in the National System through a formal WSR study re-
port.46 The report includes a suitability analysis that considers three pri-
mary factors: (1) whether a river’s ORVs merit protection; (2) whether 
these ORVs will be protected through designation; and (3) whether any 
of the non-federal entities who could be responsible for protecting the 
river have “demonstrated [a] commitment to protect the river.”47 The 
final report must comply with the requirements under the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) and is reviewed for ninety days by all 
concerned federal agency officials, including the Secretary of the Army 
and the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and 
the governor of the state in which the river is located.48 After the review 
period, the study is sent to Congress to decide whether to include the 
river area in the National System.49 
2. State-Administered Rivers: Section 2(a)(ii) 
 Section 2(a)(ii) of the WSRA provides for state-administered riv-
ers to be included in the National System.50 Under this section, the 
Secretary of the Interior can include a river in the National System 
upon receipt of an application by the governor of a state in which the 
                                                                                                                      
42 Diedrich & Thomas, supra note 38, at 8. 
43 Id. at 8–9. 
44 Id. at 9. 
45 Id. at 11. 
46 Id. at 19. 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1506.8(b)(2)(ii) (2007) (authorizing preparation of an environmental impact statement 
for Wild and Scenic Rivers studies); Diedrich & Thomas, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
49 Diedrich & Thomas, supra note 38, at 20. 
50 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2000). Like the section 5 “Instant” 
rivers, section 2(a) included two rivers—the AWW and a portion of the Wolf River in Wis-
consin—for immediate inclusion under the Act upon application by the state governors. 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 2(a), 82 Stat. 906, 907 (1968) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1273 (2000)). 
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river flows.51 Unlike federally administered rivers, which require acts 
of Congress both to authorize a study and to designate the river, state-
administered rivers are included in the National System by approval 
of the Secretary of the Interior.52 In practical terms, this process grants 
to states more control over the nomination, study, and inclusion of a 
river because the ultimate decision does not require the deliberation of 
Congress.53 
a. The Process for Inclusion Under Section 2(a)(ii) 
 The WSRA allows for the study process to begin with a state re-
quest for a joint study conducted by federal and state agencies.54 In 
fact, the WSRA requires the Secretary of the Interior to approve a 
study if one is requested.55 In order for a river to qualify as a state-
administered river under section 2(a)(ii), it must meet certain quali-
fications.56 First, the river must have been designated as part of a 
state’s system for river protection by an act of the state’s legislature.57 
Second, the criteria for which it is protected at the state level must 
meet the criteria established in the preamble to the WSRA: it must be 
“free-flowing” and possess one or more “outstandingly remarkable 
values.”58 Third, the non-federal lands surrounding the river must be 
administered by a state agency, and resources must be in place to en-
sure protection of the ORVs for which the river is being protected.59 
 If all requirements are met, the Secretary of the Interior is re-
quired to foster state participation by determining how state and local 
governments can participate in a preservation plan, and by providing 
                                                                                                                      
51 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a). The Governor of Maine’s letter accompanying the AWW appli-
cation requested that the entire AWW be included in the National System—rather than a 
portion of the AWW as had been proposed earlier—because “all concerned feel this is as it 
should be considering the character of the area and our understanding of the intent of the 
National Act.” Letter from Kenneth M. Curtis, Governor, State of Me., to Walter J. Hickel, 
U.S. Sec’y of the Interior (May 4, 1970) (on file with Boston College Environmental 
Affairs Law Review). 
52 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a); see Notice of Approval, supra note 3, at 11,525. 
53 Haas, supra note 24, at 2. 
54 16 U.S.C. § 1276(c). 
55 Id. (“The study of any of said rivers shall be pursued in as close cooperation with ap-
propriate agencies . . . as possible . . . if request for such joint study is made by the State.”) 
(emphasis added). 
56 Haas, supra note 24, at 8. 
57 Id. 
58 16 U.S.C. § 1271; Haas, supra note 24, at 8; see 16 U.S.C. § 1286(b) (defining “[f]ree-
flowing” as “existing or flowing in natural condition without impoundment, diversion, 
straightening, rip-rapping, or other modification of the waterway”). 
59 Haas, supra note 24, at 8. 
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technical assistance to state and local governments and local private 
interests.60 During this time, an environmental impact statement is 
prepared and circulated to the appropriate reviewing agencies in or-
der to comply with NEPA requirements, and public comments are 
reviewed.61 Finally, if the Secretary designates a river, it is assigned one 
of the three classifications in the Act—wild, scenic, or recreational— 
in order to guide state and local decisions as to which future land uses 
might be appropriate along the river.62 
b. Encouraging State Participation 
 One of the most significant aspects of the section 2(a)(ii) desig-
nation process is the limited role played by the federal government.63 
The WSRA notes that all state-administered lands are to be adminis-
tered “without expense to the United States.”64 This language has 
been interpreted to mean that the WSRA prohibits the federal gov-
ernment from spending money on state-administered rivers.65 As a 
result, state participation is imperative for rivers admitted into the Na-
tional System under section 2(a)(ii).66 
 In the early history of the WSRA, a lack of state participation was a 
significant stumbling block for including state rivers in the WSRA.67 Be-
tween 1968 and 1978, only five state-administered rivers were nominated 
for inclusion under the Act, despite the fact that Congress had “envi-
sioned a prominent State role” in river designation.68 A report by the 
General Accounting Office—the investigative arm of Congress— identi-
fied two reasons for the lack of enthusiasm among the states.69 First, 
                                                                                                                      
60 16 U.S.C. § 1276(c); Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 716. 
61 Haas, supra note 24, at 9. 
62 Id.; see Notice of Approval, supra note 3, at 11,525. 
63 See 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a). 
64 Id. 
65 Gary G. Marsh, Bureau of Land Mgmt., A Compendium of Questions & An-
swers Relating to Wild & Scenic Rivers: Technical Report of the Interagency 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Coordinating Council 40 (2006), http://www.rivers.gov (fol-
low “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “A Compendium of Questions & Answers Relat-
ing to Wild & Scenic Rivers” hyperlink). 
66 See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1623, at 3 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3801, 3803 
(noting that “since the task of preserving and administering such streams is not one that 
can or should be undertaken solely by the Federal Government, the States ought to be 
encouraged to undertake as much of the job as possible”). 
67 Haas, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
68 Id. at 6 (quoting Comptroller General of the U.S., Federal Protection and 
Preservation of Wild and Scenic Rivers is Slow and Costly 17 (1978)). 
69 Comptroller General of the U.S., supra note 68, at 17; Haas, supra note 24, at 6; 
see also Jack Hannon & Tom Cassidy, Section 2(a)(ii) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968: 
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some states felt that inclusion in the WSRA would be “too costly” because 
the state would bear the burden of administration and land-acquisition 
costs.70 Second, the Department of the Interior had adopted a narrow 
interpretation of the “without expense to the United States” provision of 
the WSRA.71 As a result, even if the federal government were to spend 
money on federal lands within a state-administered system, the river could 
not be admitted under the WSRA.72 
 An amendment passed in 1978 remedied many of these problems 
by providing that state-administered rivers would be administered with-
out expense to the federal government “other than for administration 
and management of federally owned lands.”73 Since the 1978 amend-
ment, at least fifteen rivers or segments of rivers have been added as 
state-administered rivers under the WSRA.74 
C. Corridor Management After a River is Included in the National System 
 Once a river is included in the National System under either sec-
tion 5 or section 2(a)(ii), it is immune from any new federal resource 
development project such as dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power-
houses, or transmission lines.75 Nonetheless, since protected river areas 
often include private or state-owned land, this prohibition leaves room 
for local discretion in land use decisions that could affect the river’s 
ORVs.76 The federal government has “little or no control” over such 
decisions.77 For federally administered rivers, the WSRA grants to Con-
gress some authority to acquire land within a congressionally desig-
nated river’s boundaries.78 However, owing to the limitations on federal 
funding and the slowness of the purchase process, these remedies often 
                                                                                                                      
An Underutilized Tool to Designate National Wild and Scenic Rivers, 17 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y 145, 149 (1998–99). 
70 Comptroller General of the U.S., supra note 68, at 17. 
71 See id. at 18–19. 
72 See id. at 19. 
73 National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 761, 92 Stat. 3467; 
see Haas, supra note 24, at 7. 
74 River Mileage Chart, supra note 32, at 1–18. 
75 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 7(a), 16. U.S.C. § 1278 (2000). 
76 Thomas, supra note 22, at 6. 
77 Id. 
78 16 U.S.C. § 1277; Thomas, supra note 22, at 6. See generally Jackie Diedrich et al., Wild 
and Scenic Rivers and the Use of Eminent Domain: Technical Report of the Interagency 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Coordinating Council (1998), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Publica-
tions” hyperlink; then follow “Wild & Scenic Rivers and the Use of Eminent Domain” hyperlink) 
(analyzing the use of eminent domain to protect federally administered rivers). 
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leave a large hole in protection.79 Likewise, for state-administered riv-
ers, the federal government has virtually no recourse for mismanage-
ment because the river area is administered “without expense to the 
United States.”80 
 In order to mitigate this protection gap, the WSRA relies heavily 
on cooperation among state and local governments, landowners, and 
private organizations.81 This strategy allows a great deal of creativity in 
developing river management plans, but also demands careful main-
tenance of relationships among the various entities.82 For section 5 
rivers, federal agencies must tread lightly, balancing their desire to 
establish uniformity among rivers in the system against the deference 
required to avoid micromanaging state and local agencies and un-
dermining the trust required for a successful strategy.83 
 Notwithstanding the disparity of federal power between federal 
and state-administered rivers, the WSRA makes no distinction be-
tween the level of rigorousness used to administer each type of river.84 
To that end, the three-tiered category system is used as administration 
guidelines for all rivers in the system.85 Within these guidelines, the 
Secretaries have great discretion in carrying out the purposes of the 
WSRA.86 Nonetheless, protection standards still should ensure that a 
river segment’s classification does not change from one category to 
another.87 Thus, while each category should be administered equally 
to ensure the preservation of ORVs in that category, as a practical 
matter, wild rivers require more stringent levels of protection than 
scenic or recreational rivers.88 Ultimately, although the federal gov-
ernment has virtually no power over state rivers, the WSRA demands 
that state-administered rivers are not run as “second class” rivers.89 
                                                                                                                      
79 Thomas, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
80 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a). 
81 Thomas, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 See 16. U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287. 
85 Thomas, supra note 22, at 8. 
86 See McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting that “[t]he 
choice of what shall be preserved is an administrative choice in which geographical and 
topographical considerations are certainly germane but hardly are subject to judicial re-
view”). 
87 Thomas, supra note 22, at 8; Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 719–20. 
88 Jackie Diedrich, U.S. Forest Serv., Wild & Scenic River Management Respon-
sibilities: Technical Report of the Interagency Wild and Scenic Rivers Coordi-
nating Council 5 (2002), http://www.rivers.gov (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then 
follow “Wild & Scenic River Management Responsibilities” hyperlink). 
89 Marsh, supra note 65, at 23. 
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D. Incentive and Accountability for State Governments Under Section 2(a)(ii) 
 The regulatory scheme established by the WSRA includes an am-
biguous balance of power between the federal and state governments, 
particularly with regard to section 2(a)(ii) rivers.90 The language of 
the statute does not indicate why the state governments would have 
any incentive to participate in the WSRA.91 Equally unclear is the in-
centive provided for states to administer their rivers in conformance 
with the categories established by the Act is equally unclear.92 Al-
though the WSRA explicitly announces a federal interest in preserv-
ing the nation’s rivers in their free-flowing condition, it does not issue 
a mandate to the states to protect this interest.93 Especially consider-
ing that the federal government is prohibited from spending money 
on state-administered rivers, states are neither persuaded nor explic-
itly required under the WSRA to adhere to federal standards.94 
 Notwithstanding the lack of explicit incentives in the statute, 
there are several advantages available to states participating in the 
WSRA under section 2(a)(ii).95 The incentive most clearly implicated 
in the statute is the protection that the WSRA affords against federally 
sponsored dam projects.96 This grant of power allowing the states to 
circumvent congressional designation is most significant when Con-
gress would otherwise reject a designation under section 5 in favor of 
developing a hydroelectric project.97 A second advantage of participa-
tion in the WSRA is that states may prevent federal control over the 
rivers within their boundaries.98 A third, and often noted, purpose for 
including a river in the system is the publicity value of having it in-
cluded in the National System.99 
                                                                                                                      
90 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1281; see Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 417, 430 
(1984). 
91 16 U.S.C. § 1281. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. § 1271. 
94 See id. § 1273(a). 
95 Hannon & Cassidy, supra note 69, at 151–52; Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 715. 
96 See 16 U.S.C. § 1271; Diedrich & Thomas, supra note 38, at 19–20; Hannon & 
Cassidy, supra note 69, at 147–48; Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 15, at 715. 
97 See Hannon & Cassidy, supra note 69, at 151–52 (citing an instance where state des-
ignation was used as a political maneuver to prevent dam construction in order to protect 
the New River in North Carolina). 
98 See id. at 152 (noting that the designation of the AWW “came about as a result of a 
desire within the state to prevent federal control of the river”). 
99 See id. (explaining that the designation of the Lumber River in North Carolina un-
der section 2(a)(ii) “appears to have been motivated at least in part by a desire to promote 
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 Moreover, once a river is included in the WSRA, the National Sys-
tem does not encumber the state government with much accountabil-
ity.100 Of course, during the application process, states must comply 
with federal designation requirements, including the preparation of 
reports to satisfy NEPA requirements.101 Once a river is in the system, 
however, the state does not report to the federal government, nor 
does the federal government have any immediate recourse to ensure 
that the state administers its rivers for the reasons that the rivers were 
included in the WSRA.102 As such, while the federal government must 
strive to maintain a balance between uniform preservation of national 
rivers and formation of individual management plans to protect each 
river’s specific ORVs, the state and local governments owe no such 
regard to the National System.103 This distinction places states in a 
position of power, and reveals at least one unilateral advantage for the 
states in this particular form of cooperative federalism.104 
                                                                                                                      
increased tourism through additional public recognition”); see also National Scenic Rivers 
System: Hearings on H.R. 8416, H.R. 90, S. 119 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l 
Parks and Recreation of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. 86 (1968) 
(statement of Rep. Donald M. Fraser, Minnesota) (noting that the St. Croix and Nameka-
gon Rivers should be added to the National System on account of their availability to ma-
jor metropolitan areas and “because of the ease and speed of today’s transportation sys-
tems, they are available with only slightly more effort to all Americans”); Tarlock & Tippy, 
supra note 15, at 715. 
100 See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(d) (“The jurisdiction of the States over waters of any stream 
included in a national wild, scenic or recreational river area shall be unaffected by this 
chapter to the extent that such jurisdiction may be exercised without impairing the pur-
poses of this chapter or its administration.”). 
101 See Haas, supra note 24, at 9. 
102 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287; see H.R. Rep. No. 90-1623, at 3 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3801, 3803. As noted above, the WSRA is designed in part to allow rivers to 
be administered on an individualized basis, since each river is unique. See Haas, supra note 
24, at 10–19. Once admitted into the National System under one of the three protective 
categories, a river can be administered in any number of ways to preserve the values for 
which it was included. See id. 
103 See National Wild and Scenic Rivers System; Final Revised Guidelines for Eligibility, 
Classification and Management of River Areas, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,454 (Sept. 7, 1982); Tho-
mas, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
104 See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 179, 200 (2005) (characterizing the section 2(a)(ii) designation process as an 
example of “procedural favoritism” employed in several schemes of cooperative federal-
ism). 
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II. The Development of Cooperative Federalism: 
A “Field of Experiment” 
 The tradition of dividing power between the federal and state gov-
ernments in environmental regulation traces its roots to the founding 
of the Nation.105 The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitu-
tion states that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance there of . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”106 Also, the Tenth Amendment declares that “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”107 Throughout the history of the United States, the on-
going effort to interpret this balance of power between the federal and 
state governments has inspired both creativity and conflict.108 
 While the phrase “cooperative federalism” has its jurisprudential 
roots in a 1950 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, a symposium published by the Iowa Law Review in 1938 traced 
the mechanics of cooperative federalism to the middle of the nine-
teenth century.109 The symposium identified “an entirely new field of 
experiment characterized by the participation of several governments 
in cooperative legislative or administrative action.”110 In subsequent 
case law, courts have characterized cooperative federalism in different 
ways, but have not significantly deviated from this initial descrip-
tion.111 Yet for as long as this form of cooperation has been an opera-
tive principle in government, scholars and statespersons have strug-
gled to identify the allocations of power specific to the federal and 
state governments in this “field of experiment.”112 Indeed, some 
                                                                                                                      
105 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 100 (2d ed. 2005). 
106 U.S. Const. art. VI. 
107 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
108 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation 
of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 719, 722–23 (2006). 
109 Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 816 n.14 (9th Cir. 1950); Glicks-
man, supra note 108, at 725; Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 459, 
459 (1938). 
110 Foreword, Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 455, 455 (1938). 
111 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (stating that cooperative 
federalism includes statutory programs that “anticipate[] a partnership between the States 
and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective”); see also Hodel v. Va. Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (describing “cooperative fed-
eralism” as a model “that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum 
standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet 
their own particular needs”). 
112 Foreword, supra note 110, at 456. 
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commentators have argued that the ambiguity over these power as-
signments is an advantage deliberately built into the Republic by the 
Framers themselves.113 
A. Cooperative Federalism in Environmental Regulation 
1. Federal Regulation in Pollution Control and Resource Management 
 The history of a significant federal government presence in the 
arena of pollution control began in 1970.114 Until then, the regulation 
of the environment was an area left largely to the states.115 Acting 
through their residuary Tenth Amendment police powers to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens, the states took primary 
responsibility for regulating pollution through local land use laws, 
elementary pollution control statutes, and common law litigation.116 
The federal government intervened only after it became clear that 
pollution did not conform neatly within state boundaries, and that 
states could not regulate pollution effectively on their own.117 
 In 1970, the federal government embarked on an initiative to 
take control of pollution regulation.118 That year, Congress enacted 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), and President Nixon issued an executive 
order creating the Environmental Protection Agency.119 In the follow-
ing decade, Congress enacted more than twenty federal environ-
mental laws, exercising its authority under the Commerce Clause to 
absorb the responsibilities of the states in the arena of national pollu-
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. at 455 (“This interminable disagreement, with its occasional bitterness, is it-
self testimony to the wisdom of the constitutional generalization. Had the controls been 
locked, had the framers precluded the continual experiment and adjustment of state-
federal relationships to changing circumstances, the union could not possibly have en-
dured.”). 
114 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 
54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1147 (1995). 
115 Id. Professor Percival notes several instances of early federal government responses 
to “pollution,” including the Refuse Act of 1899, an act that prohibited refuse barriers in 
navigable waterways, and the Esch-Hughes Act of 1912, an act that restricted the use of 
white phosphorous in match manufacturing to prevent phosphorous necrosis or “phossy 
jaw.” Id. at 1149–50; see also Esch-Hughes Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-112, 37 Stat. 81 
(1912); Refuse Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (repealed 1972). 
116 Glicksman, supra note 108, at 729–30. 
117 See Percival, supra note 114, at 1157. 
118 Id. at 1159. 
119 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1705 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2000)); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 184–89 (2000); see Percival, supra note 114, at 1160. 
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tion control.120 The development of strong federal legislation during 
this period was due to a public recognition that the states could not by 
themselves address the problem of pollution.121 Not only was the fed-
eral government better equipped to provide resources to confront 
national pollution problems, but it also was immune to interstate 
competition for pollution control restrictions that devolved into a 
“race to the bottom” among states vying to attract business.122 As a re-
sult, when states challenged Congress’s authority to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause, they often lost.123 
 In comparison to the field of pollution control, the federal pres-
ence in the arena of resource management is significantly older.124 Dat-
ing from 1849, when Congress created the Department of the Interior 
to regulate the transfer of public lands to private parties, the federal 
environmental policy in the mid-nineteenth century focused on the 
development of natural resources.125 This period saw a flurry of con-
gressional activity designed to encourage private development of the 
federal government’s massive land holdings.126 However, as the century 
drew to a close, scientific studies challenged the wisdom of unchecked 
exploitation of natural resources.127 Federal policy shifted from re-
source development to resource conservation, resulting in a conflict 
between federal and state interests that had previously been aligned 
under development policies.128 While the conservation movement was 
not without initial controversy, the Supreme Court ultimately validated 
the power of the federal government as preempting state laws that con-
flicted with federal policy.129 
2. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 The expansive power granted to the federal government in the 
field of environmental regulation corresponded with a broad interpre-
                                                                                                                      
120 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; Glicksman, supra note 108, at 728; Percival, supra note 114, 
at 1160. 
121 Glicksman, supra note 108, at 731–32. 
122 Id. at 730–31, 736. 
123 Id. at 747; see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting 
that “it has seldom if ever been doubted that Congress has power in order to attain a le-
gitimate end” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420 (1819))). 
124 Percival, supra note 114, at 1147. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.; see, e.g., General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000). 
127 A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1315, 1342 (1995). 
128 Percival, supra note 114, at 1147–48. 
129 Tarlock, supra note 127, at 1342. 
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tation of the Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court.130 During the 
period from 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court did not strike down a 
single federal law for exceeding Congress’s power under the Com-
merce Clause.131 However, in 1995 in United States v. Lopez, and in 2000 
in United States v. Morrison, the Court invalidated two federal statutes as 
exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power.132 These statutes 
were invalidated on the grounds that the activities that they regulated 
did not substantially affect interstate commerce.133 Since 2000, the 
Court has not invalidated any further laws as exceeding congressional 
commerce power.134 Yet the specter of Lopez and Morrison overshadows 
all contemporary considerations of Congress’s power to regulate the 
activities of state and local governments.135 
 Another significant development in constitutional law affecting 
contemporary conceptions of cooperative federalism is the Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
130 See Chemerinsky, supra note 105, at 129–38. The Supreme Court affirmed an ex-
pansive interpretation of the federal government’s power over interstate commerce in the 
early twentieth century. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (affirming 
Congress’s power to regulate intrastate wheat production of local farmers because, al-
though the individual effects of each farmer were trivial, their contributions “taken to-
gether with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial”); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (holding that Congress had power to regulate manufac-
turing because “[w]hile manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce the shipment of 
manufactured goods interstate is such commerce”); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (finding congressional power to regulate a 
labor dispute because it affected commerce in so far as it “burden[ed] or obstruct[ed] 
commerce or the free flow of commerce”). 
131 Chemerinsky, supra note 105, at 131. 
132 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that “[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity,” de-
spite congressional findings that gender-motivated violence drained billions of dollars 
from the American economy); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding 
Congress’s attempt to punish a high school student for possession of a handgun in a public 
school unconstitutional under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because the activity 
did not “substantially affect[]” interstate commerce). 
133 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
134 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act, which criminalized the manufacture and possession of marijuana, 
did not exceed Congress’s authority, notwithstanding the provisions of California’s Com-
passionate Use Act of 1996 that authorized the cultivation and use of marijuana for medi-
cal purposes). 
135 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Rapanos v. United States, 
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223 (2006) (interpreting narrowly the definition of “waters” in the Clean 
Water Act, as applied to wetlands within a state to exclude areas that the federal govern-
ment sought to regulate); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (holding that federal jurisdiction over a waste disposal 
site exceeded the authority granted under the Clean Water Act, despite the fact that mi-
gratory birds used the waters). 
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Court’s recent jurisprudence on federal preemption of state laws.136 In 
addition to express preemption, in which Congress explicitly preempts 
state law on the face of a statute, the Court has found three types of 
implied preemption: field preemption, conflict preemption, and a state 
law impeding a federal objective.137 In determining if a federal statute 
preempts state law, courts must ascertain the statute’s congressional 
purpose.138 While the Supreme Court has found preemption in many 
recent cases, the Court has also emphasized the importance of deter-
mining the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” when the federal 
government regulates an area of traditional state concern, such as land 
use.139 Since every regulatory arrangement is unique, there is no 
bright-line test for determining when the federal government purpose-
fully preempts state law.140 Rather, the statutes at issue must be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis to determine how the federal government 
intended its regulatory framework to function.141 
                                                                                                                      
136 Chemerinsky, supra note 105, at 366–81. 
137 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). In Gade, the Court 
articulated its preemption analysis as follows: 
Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and “is compelled whether 
Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose.” Absent explicit pre-emptive lan-
guage, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field 
pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it,” and conflict pre-emption, where “compliance with both fed-
eral and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
138 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996) (noting that “any understand-
ing of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a ‘fair understanding of 
congressional purpose’”) (citation omitted). 
139 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (reciting the requirement that a “clear and manifest” 
purpose of Congress must be found); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; see also Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
388 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (finding federal pre-
emption of state law). 
140 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486. The Court noted that: 
Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the 
pre-emption statute . . . and the ‘structure and purpose of the statute as a 
whole,’ as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s rea-
soned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute . . . to 
affect . . . the law. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
141 Id. 
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B. Federal and State Power Is Unclear from Statutory Language That 
Explicitly Provides for State Participation 
 While many federal environmental statutes explicitly delineate 
the cooperative relationship that they seek to establish among the lev-
els of government, the enforcement of these statutes often reveals dif-
ferent relationships in practice.142 In the pollution control context, 
most statutes reflect congressional mindfulness of the traditional role 
assumed by states for protecting public health, safety, and welfare.143 
The Clean Water Act, for example, states that “[i]t is the policy of the 
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution 
. . . .”144 Many environmental statutes buttress this policy by allowing 
states to regulate at stricter levels than the federal government if they 
choose to do so.145 However, notwithstanding this deferential lan-
guage to state regulation, the federal government retains significant, 
and often primary, enforcement power under these statutes.146 
 In the context of resource management, many statutes emphasize 
the principal role of the federal government.147 Rather than recogniz-
ing the primary authority of state governments, as pollution control 
statutes do, these resource management statutes conceive of the fed-
eral government sharing its own power with the states.148 However, 
many of these statutes simultaneously carve out specific provisions for 
                                                                                                                      
142 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (2000) 
(noting that “the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily 
the function of State, regional, and local agencies”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) 
(2000) (stating that “air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of 
States and local governments”). 
143 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000); see Glicksman, supra note 108, 
at 738. 
144 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). 
145 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370; 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
146 See Glicksman, supra note 108, at 740 (“The terminology of state primacy and of 
federal-state partnerships is misleading, however. The federal pollution control statutes 
unquestionably put the federal government . . . in the driver’s seat.”). 
147 See Fischman, supra note 104, at 200–03. 
148 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000) (requiring that the 
Secretary of the Interior “cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States”); 
Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000) (ordering the Bureau of 
Land Management to work with state and local governments in developing land use plans 
“to the extent consistent with the [federal] laws governing the administration of the public 
lands”). 
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state power in federal management processes.149 In statutes that con-
tain language identifying concurrent federal and state power, the as-
signment of power can be ambiguous on the face of the statute.150 
 The language of power arrangements in these statutes does not 
ring hollow, and courts often use this language to inform their inter-
pretations of the substantive provisions of these statutes.151 Yet the lan-
guage of the statutes themselves offer little insight into the sources of 
power from which they draw their authority because courts use tradi-
tional conceptions of federal and state power to inform their statutory 
interpretation.152 Therefore, rather than examining statutory lan-
guage, a more useful method for analyzing the balance of power in 
cooperative federalism is to consider how courts have articulated the 
interaction of the sources of federal and state power when confronted 
with questions of statutory interpretation.153 
C. An Early Example of Cooperative Federalism: Liquor Control 
 One early example of the use of cooperative federalism emerged 
in the pre-Prohibition control of liquor traffic.154 In the period between 
1843, when Oregon enacted the first territory-wide prohibition law, and 
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, the federal and 
state governments experimented with various forms of liquor regula-
tion.155 During this time, the number of prohibition states ebbed and 
flowed, falling as low as three in 1904 and rising as high as thirty-two in 
1918.156 States attempting to enforce their prohibition requirements 
faced significant challenges from outside exporters because state stat-
utes could not interfere with interstate commerce, an area of power 
explicitly granted to the federal government in the Constitution.157 
                                                                                                                      
149 See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 1276(c) (2000) (requiring the 
Secretary of the Interior to pursue “[t]he study of any of said rivers . . . if request for such 
joint study is made by the State”). 
150 See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd 
(2000) (ordering the federal government to align its conservation plans for national wild-
life refuges with state plans, but only “to the extent practicable”). 
151 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223 (2006). 
152 Id. at 2223 n.7, 2224 (noting that such an expansive interpretation of “waters of the 
United States” implicated the “outer limits of Congress’s commerce power”). 
153 Id. 
154 Notes, Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 635, 637 (1938). 
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Without supplemental federal regulation, states were powerless to en-
force their prohibition laws.158 
1. Federal Solutions: The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts 
 To facilitate the states in regulating liquor traffic, Congress passed 
the Wilson Act, which allowed the states to regulate liquor as soon as it 
“arrived” within their boundaries.159 Under the Wilson Act, intoxicating 
liquors shipped in interstate commerce could be regulated by state law 
upon arrival “to the same extent and in the same manner as though 
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Terri-
tory.”160 While the Supreme Court upheld this creative solution as a 
valid exercise of Congressional authority, the Court almost immediately 
undercut its effectiveness by holding in several cases that “arrival” into a 
state meant receipt by an in-state recipient, rather than entrance into 
state territory.161 In response to the Wilson Act, out-of-state shippers 
simply shipped alcohol directly to customers through mail-order busi-
nesses.162 Thus, despite Congress’s effort to grant states more regula-
tory power, neither government retained any control over the liquor 
industry.163 Congress lacked the wherewithal to enact a uniform regula-
tion over interstate commerce that would place the interests of “dry 
states” over “wet states,” and states could not manage this traffic without 
interfering with interstate commerce.164 
 In response, Congress supplemented the Wilson Act with the 
Webb-Kenyon Act, which explicitly “divest[ed] intoxicating liquors of 
their interstate character in certain cases.”165 Under the Webb-Kenyon 
Act, Congress deemed it illegal to ship or transport liquor into any 
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state where the liquor was intended to be used in violation of that 
state’s laws.166 As a result, state law provided the substance of the fed-
eral law, and liquor was subject to state law as soon as it entered into 
the state, rather than when it reached its destination.167 The Webb-
Kenyon Act provided no penalties and could have no practical effect 
unless the states acted.168 Yet this piece of “permissive legislation” al-
lowed the federal government to regulate liquor effectively.169 As a 
result, even after the federal government assumed complete domin-
ion over the field of liquor control through the passage of the Eight-
eenth Amendment in 1919, the Supreme Court held that the Webb-
Kenyon Act was consistent with federal law.170 
2. Initial Reactions to the Webb-Kenyon Act 
 Some early commentators reacting to the Webb-Kenyon Act ques-
tioned its constitutional validity.171 These responses echoed the senti-
ments of President Taft, who vetoed the bill on the grounds that it 
illegally delegated federal authority to the states.172 A central purpose 
for the formation of the United States, Taft argued, “was to relieve the 
commerce between the States of the burdens which local State jeal-
ousies and purposes had in the past imposed upon it . . . .”173 By grant-
ing states the power to regulate a subject of interstate commerce, 
states could not only control shipments of liquor within their borders, 
but also incidentally could control the formation of contracts in other 
states to which this liquor would be shipped.174 Moreover, if this novel 
legislation could withhold federal regulation over a subject so impor-
tant as liquor control, “it is difficult to see how [Congress] may not 
suspend interstate commerce in respect to every subject of commerce 
whenever the police power of the State can be exercised to hinder or 
obstruct that commerce.”175 
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3. The Supreme Court Rules: James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western 
Maryland Railway Co. 
 Four years after the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, the Su-
preme Court affirmed its validity in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western 
Maryland Railway Co.176 In upholding the Act, Chief Justice Edward 
Douglass White analyzed in surgical detail the argument that Con-
gress had impermissibly delegated its authority to the states, and con-
cluded that it “rest[ed] on a mere misconception.”177 Chief Justice 
White noted that the federal power to regulate interstate commerce is 
plenary.178 Congress could use the states in its regulatory scheme if it 
wanted to do so, and to hold otherwise would be to “announce the 
contradiction in terms that because Congress had exerted a regula-
tion lesser in power than it was authorized to exert, therefore its ac-
tion was void for excess of power.”179 Delegation was not abdication 
simply because Congress chose to lessen its own power to accomplish 
a purpose entrusted to it by the Constitution.180 On the contrary, “the 
will which causes the prohibitions to be applicable is that of Congress, 
since the application of state prohibitions would cease the instant the 
act of Congress ceased to apply.”181 
III. Comparing the Webb-Kenyon Act to the WSRA 
A. Similarities Between the Webb-Kenyon Act and the WSRA 
 Although the Webb-Kenyon Act and the WSRA address funda-
mentally different subject matters, the relationships that they establish 
between the federal and state governments are strikingly similar.182 
First, under the WSRA’s section 2(a)(ii), the federal and state gov-
ernments have entered into a regulatory relationship to accomplish a 
goal that neither level of government could reach on its own: a uni-
form system for preserving certain of the nation’s rivers that allows 
each river to be regulated for its own particular values.183 Without the 
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protection of the Federal Act, the states would not be able to preserve 
their rivers against federal agencies seeking to develop dams and 
other hydroelectric projects.184 Much like state laws under the Webb-
Kenyon Act, without federal support the states’ regulatory purposes 
would be rendered completely powerless due to the federal govern-
ment’s plenary grant of power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late the nation’s rivers.185 Likewise, under the WSRA the federal gov-
ernment cannot unilaterally enforce the provisions of the Act among 
the states, just as it could not under the pre-Prohibition Webb-Kenyon 
Act.186 Rather, preservation of a river requires the coordination of the 
river’s various stakeholders, just as the regulation of liquor required 
the cooperation of a multitude of state and local officials.187 Thus, 
without either level of government, both laws would fail to accomplish 
their purposes.188 
 Second, under both the WSRA and the Webb-Kenyon Act, in order 
for the federal government to accomplish its purposes, its regulatory 
regime provides a place for the states to exercise police powers.189 In 
the context of liquor control, states that chose to prohibit liquor within 
their borders exercised their police power to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of their citizens.190 Likewise, in the context of river preser-
vation, the states exercise their traditional powers over land use.191 
These valid exercises of police power occur through a self-imposed 
limitation of the federal government’s plenary authority over interstate 
commerce.192 These limitations provide states with the power to regu-
late an otherwise impermissible area of interstate commerce in con-
formance with its local preferences.193 Yet in each case, “the will which 
causes [these preferences] to be applicable is that of Congress.”194 
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 Finally, under both the WSRA and the Webb-Kenyon Act, if the 
federal government had elected to exercise its plenary authority un-
der the Commerce Clause, its activity would substantially resemble an 
exercise of power traditionally reserved to the states.195 In the context 
of liquor control, the federal government had plenary power to regu-
late the flow of interstate trafficking.196 Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of the Webb-Kenyon Act, the federal government could exercise 
this control within a state’s boundaries until the liquor reached its 
final destination.197 From the time that the liquor crossed state lines 
until the time that it reached its final destination, the federal govern-
ment could regulate the flow of liquor entirely within a state.198 This 
regulation would closely resemble a state’s police power to regulate 
liquor, but would in fact be a separate exercise of power, drawn from a 
direct grant of constitutional authority over interstate commerce.199 
Similarly, notwithstanding the section 2(a)(ii) provision of the WSRA, 
the federal government could exercise complete control over “certain 
selected rivers of the Nation . . . possess[ing] outstandingly remark-
able . . . values.”200 If Congress had chosen to regulate these rivers, in 
spite of the practical challenges of doing so, its regulation would 
closely resemble an exercise of a state’s traditional police power to 
regulate land use.201 Yet, again the federal power would be drawn 
from a higher authority.202 
B. Differences Between the Webb-Kenyon Act and the WSRA 
 No two schemes of cooperative federalism are exactly alike; each is 
the product of a unique set of circumstances confronting the federal 
and state governments.203 While the regulatory structure of the WSRA 
bears substantial similarities to the Webb-Kenyon Act, the two are not 
identical.204 The most significant difference is the manner in which the 
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Acts allow for state regulation.205 Under the Webb-Kenyon Act, the fed-
eral government literally completely divested itself of authority over 
liquor shipped in interstate commerce when use of that liquor would 
conflict with state laws.206 In contrast, under the WSRA the federal gov-
ernment simply provides an independent method for states to partici-
pate in regulation, but does not cut short its own power.207 
 Moreover, under the WSRA, a state’s regulatory authority is con-
ditioned upon its fulfillment of its obligation to administer rivers in a 
manner that protects the values for which the rivers are included in 
the system.208 In James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway 
Co., Chief Justice White noted that even when the federal government 
divests itself of regulatory control, it retains power over the subjects 
entrusted to it by the Constitution.209 Thus, the relationship estab-
lished by the WSRA lends even stronger force to Chief Justice White’s 
argument that the federal government does not delegate power to the 
states simply when it includes them as part of a regulatory system.210 
IV. The Boundary Between Federal and State  
Power in the WSRA 
 A basic premise of constitutional law is that the federal govern-
ment can only act to the extent of its constitutionally allotted power.211 
Yet when the federal government does act, its laws are supreme.212 In 
schemes of cooperative federalism, the boundary between this plenary 
federal power and the residual police power belonging to the states is 
difficult to distinguish, and the WSRA is no exception.213 However, the 
Supreme Court clearly determined this boundary under the regulatory 
regime established by the Webb-Kenyon Act.214 Because of the similari-
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ties between the WSRA and the Webb-Kenyon Act, much of the Court’s 
analysis of the Webb-Kenyon Act is applicable to the WSRA.215 
A. The State of Maine’s Exercise of its Police Power 
 In passing Legislative Document 2077, the Maine legislature used 
its police power to downgrade the AWW from a “wild” river area to a 
“scenic” river area by adding six roads and permanent bridges to the 
river area.216 In doing so, the legislature shattered the compromise 
that Senator Muskie had carefully brokered between federal and state 
interests under section 2(a)(ii) of the WSRA.217 Congress made care-
ful provisions in the WSRA to protect the states’ police power to regu-
late national wild and scenic rivers.218 It noted in the WSRA that so 
long as the states fulfilled the declared federal purpose, the jurisdic-
tion of the states over waters within their boundaries would not be 
affected by the Act.219 In exchange for this grant of power, the federal 
government filled a critical gap in its preservation scheme.220 When 
the federal government restricts itself, the states can exercise their 
police powers free of the federal government, and this freedom trans-
lates into a more powerful cooperation among state and local stake-
holders in protecting rivers in the National System.221 
 Neither the Webb-Kenyon Act nor the WSRA can function effec-
tively without state participation.222 Moreover, neither statute provides 
the federal government with a remedy when the states do not adhere 
to the federal regulatory scheme.223 But neither of these characteris-
tics alone determines the boundaries of power between the federal 
and state governments.224 Because statutes are specific exercises of 
underlying constitutional authority, many schemes of cooperative fed-
eralism include statutory language that does not adequately reflect 
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the balance of power among levels of government.225 It is only when 
courts examine the constitutionality of these statutes that the sources 
of power from which they derive are identified.226 
 In James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., the 
Supreme Court held that when a state exercises its police power as 
part of a federal regulatory scheme, its power is subject to the will of 
Congress.227 Under both the Webb-Kenyon Act and the WSRA, the 
federal regulatory scheme grants nearly unbridled authority to the 
state governments to regulate within the federal system.228 Also, in 
both cases the state’s regulation closely resembles an activity tradi-
tionally regulated under the state’s police power; states have tradi-
tionally regulated both alcohol and land use to protect health, safety, 
and welfare.229 Yet the fact that both regulations are part of a larger 
federal scheme implicates the Supremacy Clause.230 The broad power 
to regulate that the states enjoy derives not from their traditional au-
thority, but from a grant of power from the federal government to 
fulfill a federal purpose.231 When Maine downgraded the AWW from a 
“wild” to a “scenic” river, it ceased to fulfill the purpose of the federal 
act that granted its own power to regulate.232 Therefore, Maine’s legis-
lature exceeded its authority to regulate the river within the three 
categories established by the WSRA.233 
 While Maine could argue that passing Legislative Document 2077 
was a valid act of its traditional police power over land use, this argu-
ment would implicate the absurdity identified by Chief Justice White 
in Clark Distilling Co.234 Maine would either argue that it was the will of 
Congress for Maine to violate the purpose of its own Federal Act, or, if 
downgrading the AWW was not Congress’s purpose, then Congress 
delegated its authority to Maine under the WSRA.235 Such an argu-
ment would result in one of two possible absurdities: if Congress did 
not delegate its power to Maine, then Congress intentionally violated 
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its own Act; but if Congress unconstitutionally delegated its own 
power to Maine, then Congress exceeded its authority by exerting less 
power than it was required to assert.236 
B. Analyzing the WSRA Under Contemporary Environmental Law 
 Like other federal resource management statutes, the WSRA 
draws its power from the Commerce Clause.237 Congress could have 
developed a hydroelectric project on the AWW, but decided instead to 
preserve the AWW for its natural beauty as a wilderness canoe area.238 
Having decided that preservation is in the best interests of the nation, 
the federal government must rely on the State of Maine for assistance 
to maintain the river perpetually so as to preserve those values for 
which it was included in the National System.239 
 In maintaining the AWW, the State of Maine acts under its tradi-
tional police power to regulate land use.240 Yet, while Maine is charged 
with administering the AWW, it does not have a concurrent obligation 
to ensure that the AWW is regulated consistently with other rivers in the 
National System with similar values.241 Indeed, one of the principle 
strengths of the WSRA is that Maine need not concern itself with other 
rivers, but only must manage the AWW to preserve its particular values 
as a canoe area.242 Under the WSRA, the interest in uniformity of pres-
ervation is a federal concern, one that the federal government ad-
dresses by admitting state-administered rivers under one of the three 
protective categories.243 
 By admitting the AWW as a “wild” river area, the federal govern-
ment established it as a “nationally significant waterway[].”244 Even 
under a narrow interpretation of the congressional Commerce Clause 
power, a court would most likely find that the WSRA is a valid exercise 
of federal power.245 The AWW attracts visitors from Maine, Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Vermont, all of whom must 
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pay for the privilege of enjoying its outstanding wilderness experi-
ence.246 Thus, the regulation of the AWW almost certainly implicates 
activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.247 
 While the federal government has authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate the AWW under the WSRA, the issue of preemption 
presents a more interesting question, particularly given Maine’s role 
under section 2(a)(ii).248 When a state fulfills its obligations under the 
WSRA to protect the values for which a river was included in the Na-
tional System, that state acts within its grant of statutorily permitted 
power from the federal government.249 However, when the state fails to 
preserve such values, or takes affirmative steps in contradiction to fed-
eral regulatory objectives, it is not immediately clear which type of pre-
emption applies.250 Under the WSRA, the federal government did not 
expressly preempt state regulation, nor did it intend to occupy the 
field; the statutory language is clear that the federal government in-
tended at least some participation from state governments.251 
 Although the Federal Government intended participation from 
state governments, it granted power to the states to regulate only “to 
the extent that such jurisdiction may be exercised without impairing 
the purposes of [the WSRA] or its administration.”252 Therefore, 
when a state administers a river in such a way as to downgrade it 
within the National System, it infringes on federal regulatory author-
ity.253 Interestingly, the WSRA does not specifically declare that down-
grading a river constitutes an infringement of its federal purposes.254 
However, when the WSRA states that “certain selected rivers . . . pos-
sess[ing] outstandingly remarkable . . . values, shall be preserved in 
free-flowing condition,” it implicitly provides that these ORVs are pre-
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served when a river is administered in its free-flowing condition 
within its designated category in the National System.255 When a state 
passes legislation to downgrade a river, it fails to preserve these ORVs, 
and violates the explicit mandate to protect the designated rivers “for 
the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations.”256 Un-
der the WSRA, any such action is preempted as either directly con-
flicting with the federal statute or impeding its purpose.257 
 Federal law requires a “clear and manifest purpose” for Congress 
to preempt an area of law such as land use that is traditionally regu-
lated under a state’s police power.258 Although Maine regulates the 
AWW using its state police power, it exercises this power on behalf of 
the federal government, which could exercise its own power over the 
AWW if it chose to do so.259 Thus, the regulation of the AWW is not an 
area of law traditionally regulated under the state’s police power be-
cause Congress has declared that preservation of the AWW is “the pol-
icy of the United States.”260 Congress has a history of managing the 
nation’s resources that dates to the mid-nineteenth century, and it 
applied its traditional federal power over rivers to the AWW by admit-
ting it to the National System as a wild river.261 Because this area of law 
is not regulated traditionally under the state’s police power, Congress 
does not require a clear and manifest purpose to preempt state law in 
order to regulate the AWW.262 
 Nevertheless, although Congress’s clear and manifest purpose is 
not required to preempt the Maine law, such purpose is evident from 
the terms of the WSRA.263 The WSRA states that “[t]he jurisdiction of 
the States over waters of any stream included in a national wild . . . 
river area shall be unaffected by this [Act] to the extent that such ju-
risdiction may be exercised without impairing the purposes of this 
[Act] or its administration.”264 However, the WSRA also states that its 
purpose is to implement the federal policy that the AWW “shall be 
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preserved in free-flowing condition.”265 Therefore, to the extent that 
the State of Maine violates its obligation to preserve the AWW as a 
“wild” river, the State’s legislation is clearly and manifestly preempted 
by this federal purpose.266 
C. Federal Supremacy Under James Clark Distilling Co. v.  
Western Maryland Railway Co. 
 The example of the Webb-Kenyon Act brings into relief the power 
relationship between the federal and state governments under the 
WSRA.267 Under both Acts, the federal government granted power to 
the states to regulate a subject of interstate commerce uninhibited by 
federal government intervention.268 In the Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress 
enabled the states to regulate liquor that would be imported into their 
boundaries through interstate commerce.269 Likewise, under the 
WSRA, the federal government granted the State of Maine power to 
perpetually administer the AWW as a wild river.270 
 Under the Supremacy Clause, the WSRA governs the administra-
tion of the AWW as the supreme law of the land.271 In the WSRA, the 
federal government carves out a certain amount of its own power to 
allow Maine to regulate the AWW.272 While the WSRA establishes a 
relationship of mutual dependence between the federal and state 
governments, any power that Maine exerts under the WSRA is exer-
cised by the will of Congress.273 The presumption that Maine’s regula-
tion is better suited to preserving the federal purpose is why the fed-
eral government grants such broad authority to Maine in the 
regulatory scheme.274 Thus, while the WSRA distinguishes between a 
uniform federal classification scheme and a process of individualized 
local administration, this regulation falls entirely under the auspices 
of Congress.275 Once Maine failed to preserve the AWW in order to 
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protect its ORVs, it threatened the federal interests in the river, and 
exceeded the boundaries of power allocated to it by the federal gov-
ernment.276 
Conclusion 
 The AWW is one of the nation’s most treasured canoe areas, and 
under the protective auspices of Congress and the State of Maine, it 
has enjoyed the protection of the “wild” river designation since 1970. 
That year represented a landmark in the federal government’s foray 
into the field of environmental protection, and it is fitting that the 
AWW is a memorial to the strong federal presence in environmental 
law. Nevertheless, the federal power over resource management dates 
to the middle of the nineteenth century. In this traditional area of 
federal concern, the power of the federal government stands as an 
obstacle to any state or local authorities that seek to deteriorate the 
values for which the AWW was included in the National System. 
 The WSRA is an example of cooperative federalism in the “field 
of experiment” between the federal and state governments. Under 
this form of regulation, the states can exercise their police powers 
over land use, while the federal government can harness the power of 
the states to fulfill its federal objectives. When the states fulfill their 
obligations under the WSRA, it represents a unique and inventive an-
swer to a preservation challenge facing both levels of government. 
However, if the states use their authority in contravention of the fed-
eral purpose, their acts are preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Only 
when Maine’s legislation is deemed preempted by federal law can the 
WSRA continue to protect the AWW as a vestige of primitive America 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
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